Contradictions Between War and Natural Trends for Peace in the Concerned Balkan State

Lavdosh Ahmetaj  
Kamila Karaj  

University "Aleksander Moisiu",  
Durres, Albania

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Abstract

War as a phenomenon of crisis as political as economic as a phenomenon and geopolitical are evidenced not just as curiosity, but viewed as clear and concrete tendencies, to attract the political and ideological attention of states and peoples who were found prone naturally towards peace. Whereas, from a geopolitical point of view, it seems that Europe, in dealing with the situation, is not sufficiently prepared for a crisis as deep as military as well as economic, which contradicts the revanchist tendencies of Russia, which in its political history has been shown. Instigator of tensions, in the troubled Balkans. This phenomenon is reflected in the history of the Balkan states since the beginning of the twentieth century. For almost a century, she has been known for inciting nationalism in the Balkans through her puppets, who already seem to be in the crosshairs of the Ukraine crisis, but also internationally. Whereas, in the inter-Balkan relations, the expression of the crisis reflects its symbiosis, which is bringing a dangerous precedent in the world peace.

Keywords: Treaty, peace, war, constitution, law, autonomy, strategy

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War gave NATO and the EU a unique opportunity to expand eastward. The costs to do so were minimal, the benefits of globalization were numerous, and the lack of a regional challenger made it relatively safe. The fall of the Berlin Wall was accompanied by talks between Americans and West Germans on the one hand and the former Soviet Union on the other. These talks aimed to guarantee a united Germany within NATO jurisdiction, the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact and the protection of the security interests of the former Soviet Union. At the time, Henry Kissinger would describe the Gorbachev-led process as "one of the most important revolutions of the time in which he lived." Given the difficult situation in which Russia found itself in the mid-1990s, its foreign policy was somewhat conditioned by the actions of the West. It was during this period that Brzezinski proposed the rapid inclusion of Central and Eastern European states in NATO and the establishment of close relations with Ukraine and other non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union.

However, steps towards NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe were not enthusiastically welcomed in Moscow, which continued to experience NATO as an opposing politico-military alliance under the watchful eye of the Cold War. And yet, Russia was then interested in a special relationship with NATO. It became the first country in 1994 to join the Partnership for Peace program. The Declaration of the Brussels Summit of January 1994 defined the Partnership for Peace as an opportunity to "expand and intensify political and military cooperation in Europe, increase stability, reduce threats to peace and build enhanced security relations".
Then, in May 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Establishment Act, expressing their determination "to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security." It is noted in the Establishment Act that NATO and Russia have agreed to base their cooperation on the principles of human rights and civil liberties. Whereas, on the other hand, the focus was on avoiding threats or the use of force against each other or any other state. This document places the political emphasis on the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their rights to choose the security model for themselves.

This document enabled Russia to monitor the security processes on its western borders, through which the Russian opposition to the inclusion of new states in NATO was minimized. The commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Eastern states that emerged from the political and economic authority of the former Soviet Union in the NATO-Russia Establishment Act, came as a logical consequence of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, where the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom pledged to "respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine" and "refrain from threatening or using force".

In exchange for these guarantees Kiev gave up the nuclear arsenal, which was considered the third largest arsenal in the world. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 further softened the differences between the West and Russia. Thus, in May 2002, NATO and Russia signed a declaration in Rome entitled "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality". Through this document, the NATO-Russia Council was established, where both sides engage with equal rights in the function of cooperation in areas such as the fight against terrorism, crisis management, arms control and missile defense.

2. The Dialectic of the Curve

As Russia and China grew in power and the 2008 economic crisis exposed the weakness of globalization, the EU and NATO had to adapt to new realities. NATO developed functions with a practical focus on building its eastern flank and control line between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Until then, Russia's empowerment posed a national security concern for the EU's eastern bloc, while the EU's western bloc faced economic problems and migratory flows from Africa and the Middle East. President Putin in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 outlined the Russian position, opposing the unipolar international order, dominated by the United States and NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe. While the decisive turning point in NATO-Russia relations was marked in 2008, due to Russia's military actions in Georgia, as a result of which it established strategic control in the Caucasus. The move was also interpreted as prompted by the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration on Ukraine and Georgia's membership, although no concrete steps have been taken since then for these countries to join NATO. A few years later, the events in Kiev's Maidan Square were experienced by Russian politics not as the will of the people for change, but as an expression of the strong political and economic pressure of the West aimed at including Ukraine in a trajectory towards the West.

This experience spurred the Russian military doctrine of 2014, listing as a major threat to Russia's security, expanding and strengthening NATO's military potential towards Russia's borders, and installing and strengthening NATO contingents in Russia's immediate neighborhood. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian foreign policy experienced a powerful turn that manifests itself even today through a confrontational relationship with the West.

2.1 Ukraine as a Gordian knot

Ukraine thus turned into an "apple of discord" between the West and Russia. As Dean Acheson once said: "Russia without Ukraine looks like a top missile beast, while Russia with Ukraine is a completely different strategic animal." Russia's recognition of the two territories in Eastern Ukraine is a violation of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the Budapest Memorandum and the Minsk Agreements. Russia's invasion of Ukraine goes beyond the denial of peaceful coexistence of sovereign states. Indeed, Russia wants to change the order established in post-Cold War Europe by using the "historic Russia" project as its source of inspiration.

3. Transition from Freezing to Kinetic Conflict

Until yesterday, the nature of the threats faced by NATO and EU member states was not the same. However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine poses a serious threat to Europe's security. Also, China's gradual empowerment has long sounded the alarm bells in Washington, while at the same time urging Europeans to improve and increase investment in NATO
defense in order to take care of their security. If you add to this the deterioration of the security environment due to socio-economic problems, the consequences of the Pandemic, as well as the humanitarian crisis as a result of the Russian occupation of Ukraine, it can be said that Europe is experiencing the twilight of security. To deal with this situation, NATO will need to strengthen its defense capabilities to prevent attacks and at the same time secure members of the Eastern bloc.

Recognizing the critical importance of the hybrid element in kinetic conflicts, it is necessary to coordinate NATO-EU efforts to neutralize the Russian hybrid war. It is also important for the West to implement an effective approach to the sanctions imposed on Russia by drawing lessons from the past. Economic sanctions should be programmed as a means of encouraging Russia to change in the long run. Reducing dependence on Russian gas without sacrificing the goals that the EU has set for itself in terms of climate change is already a necessity. It is clear that the European security order and the wider global security order that is being created by these developments will be fundamentally confrontational.

Therefore, the unity of the West symbolized in the transatlantic connection is not enough. Determination is needed to actively shape the new rules of engagement that will emerge from this conflict. The outbreak of war that followed the Russian occupation of Ukraine marks a profound turn in the world order. As such, it can not be ignored by the opinions of various analysts, which are taking place in the world of crisis. Looking at this view researcher David Harvey offers several views. There is a myth that says the world has been at peace since 1945 and that the world order built under the hegemony of the United States has worked primarily to curb the belligerent tendencies of capitalist states in competition between them.

Interstate competition in Europe that sparked two world wars was largely curbed, and West Germany and Japan were peacefully re-integrated into the world capitalist system after 1945 in part to combat the threat of Soviet communism. In the meantime, "hot" wars "both civilian and interstate" have been waged in abundance since 1945, beginning with the Korean and Vietnam Wars followed by the Yugoslav wars and the NATO bombing of Serbia. Until 1991. The Cold War provided a fairly consistent backdrop for the functioning of the world order. It was often manipulated in their economic viability by those American corporations that make up what Eisenhower long ago referred to as the military-industrial complex.

The cultivation of fear displayed in both its versions, as a false fear and another fear called true to the Soviet Union and communism as an ideology was beneficial to this policy. The economic consequence of this fear cultivation has been wave after wave of technological and organizational innovation in military equipment. Most of these were destined for widespread civilian uses, such as aviation, the Internet, and nuclear technologies, thus contributing greatly in support of the endless accumulation of capital and the increasing centralization of capitalist power in relation to an interconnected market.

Moreover, the use of "military Keynesianism" became a privileged exception in times of difficulty from neoliberal austerity regimes, periodically administered to the populations of even advanced capitalist countries after the 1970s. orchestrated an arms race against the Soviet Union played a key role at the end of the Cold War at the same time as it stiffled the economies of both countries. Prior to Reagan, the top tax rate in the United States never fell below 70 percent, and since Reagan, it has never exceeded forty percent, dismissing the right-wing insistence that taxes high inhibit growth.

The growing militaristic tendencies of the American economy after 1945 also went hand in hand with the production of greater economic inequality and the formation of a ruling oligarchy within the US as well as elsewhere, most notably in Putin's Russia. The difficulty faced by Western political elites in situations of the current type in Ukraine is that short-term and immediate problems need to be addressed in ways that should not exacerbate the roots of the conflict. At a time when insecure people often react violently, but we can not face someone who comes to us with a knife with flattering words to calm their insecurities. They should preferably disarm in ways that do not add to their insecurities.

The aim must be to lay the foundations for a more peaceful, cooperative and demilitarized world order, while limiting at the same time the terror, destruction and unnecessary loss of lives that this invasion brings. What we are witnessing in the Ukraine conflict is in many respects the product of processes that dismantled the military spirit of the Soviet regime. With the end of the Cold War, the Russians were promised a future, through a free market-based economy it is assumed that streams would spread throughout the country. Boris Kagarlitsky described the reality this way: At the end of the Cold War, the Russians believed they had boarded a jet to Paris, only to be told in the middle of the flight "welcome to Burkina Faso". There was no attempt to involve the Russian people and economy in the world system, as happened in 1945 with Japan and West Germany, and advice from the IMF and leading Western economists was to embrace neoliberal "shock therapy" as the magic wand for societies in transition. When this did not work out clearly, Western elites used the neoliberal game of blaming the victims for the underdevelopment of their human capital and for not dismantling the numerous barriers to individual enterprise, quietly blaming the rise of the oligarchs on the...
Russians themselves.

The domestic results for Russia were dire. GDP collapsed, the ruble depreciated, life expectancy plummeted, the position of women in society declined, there was a total collapse of social welfare and government institutions, the rise of mafia politics around oligarchic power, covered by a debt crisis in 1998, for which there seemed to be no way out of the way, other than begging for some crumbs from the table of rich people and submission to the dictatorship of the IMF.

Economic humiliation was total, except for the oligarchs. Despite all this, the Soviet Union disintegrated into independent republics without much popular consultation. In two or three years, Russia suffered a contraction of its population and economy along with the destruction of its industrial base, a proportionately deeper suffering than that experienced by the de-industrialization of the older regions of the United States over forty years. previous. The social, political, and economic consequences of de-industrialization in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and across the Midwest have been far-reaching (from everything from an opioid epidemic to the rise of harmful political trends supporting white supremacism and Donald Trump.

4. Shock Therapy as a Way

The impact of "shock therapy" on Russian political, cultural and economic life was much worse. The West failed to do anything but content with the supposed "end of history" under Western conditions. Then there is the issue of NATO. Originally conceived as defensive and cooperative, it became a primary military combat force, created to curb the spread of communism and prevent interstate competition in Europe from taking a military turn. Overall, it helped little as a cooperative organizational tool softening interstate competition in Europe even though Greece and Turkey have never resolved their disputes over Cyprus.

The European Union was, in practice, much more useful. But with the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO's main goal faded. The threat to the US military-industrial complex that would realize a "peace dividend" with sharp cuts in the defense budget was real. Perhaps as a result, NATO's aggressive content was actively asserted in the Clinton years, contrary to the verbal promises made to Gorbachev in the early days of perestroika. The US-led NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999 is a clear example (when the Chinese Embassy was hit, though it is not clear whether accidentally or intentionally). The US bombing of Serbia and other US interventions that violate the sovereignty of smaller nation-states have been evoked by Putin as a precedent for his actions. NATO's expansion (in the absence of any clear military threat) to the Russian border over the years has been strongly questioned in the US as well, with Donald Trump attacking the very logic of NATO's existence. Tom Friedman, a conservative commentator who recently wrote in the New York Times, evokes US guilt for recent events through its aggressive and provocative approach to Russia through NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe.

In the 1990s, it seemed like NATO was a military alliance looking for an enemy. Putin is now provoked enough to force, obviously outraged by the humiliations of Russia's economic treatment as well as the negligent Western arrogance about Russia in the global order. Political elites in the US and the West should have realized that humiliation is a catastrophic tool in diplomacy, with often lasting and catastrophic effects. The humiliation of Germany at Versailles played an important role in fomenting World War II. Political elites avoided repeating that with regard to West Germany and Japan after 1945 by means of the Marshall Plan only to repeat the catastrophic catastrophe of humiliation of Russia after the end of the Cold War.

Russia needed and deserved a Marshall Plan instead of lecturing on the honesty of neoliberal solutions in the 1990s. Half a century of humiliation of China by Western Imperialism (extending to that of Japanese occupation and the "infamous Nanjing rape" of the 1930s) is playing an important role in contemporary geopolitical battles. The lesson is simple: humiliate for your black. The humiliated one will return for his revenge, perhaps even by biting you. None of this justifies Putin's actions, more than forty years of deindustrialisation and neoliberal labor oppression do not justify Donald Trump's actions or attitudes. But even these actions in Ukraine do not justify the revival of institutions of global militarism (such as NATO) that have contributed so much to creating the problem.

In the same way that interstate competition within Europe had to be demilitarized after 1945, so too can arms races between power blocs have to be dismantled today and replaced by strong institutions of cooperation and interaction. Submission to the restrictive laws of competition both between capitalist corporations and between the blocs of power is the recipe for future calamities, though regrettably still seen by big capital as the supportive path to the endless accumulation of capital in the future.

The danger in times like this is that the slightest error in judgment by either side could easily escalate into a major confrontation between nuclear powers, in which Russia could face the hitherto overwhelming US military power. The
unipolar world run by American elites in the 1990s has already been replaced by a bipolar world. In conclusion we can say that, The political world accompanied by the crisis of its ideological identity is on its way, which is outlined through some critical moments, in its dialectic: first, February 15, 2003, millions of people around the world came out on the streets to protest against the threat of war in what even the New York Times acknowledged was a startling expression of global public opinion; Second, Unfortunately, they failed, leading to two decades of futile and destructive wars around the world; third, it seems clear in the sunlight that the people of Ukraine do not want war, the people of Russia do not want war, the European people do not want war, the peoples of North America do not want another war; third, the Popular Peace Movement is in its revival, to return, but also accompanied by its natural crisis. Whereas, States and Peoples in their spheres of sovereignty are in their time of a legitimate demand, to find the right of god's nature, to participate in the creation of the new world order, based on peace, cooperation and cooperation and not competition, coercion and fierce conflict.

In this ideological and pragmatic way, it seems that the Balkans feel more threatened than ever, because moreover Europe and America do not seek war, but it is a nationalist Serbia, but with a healing tendency, which seems to be benefiting speculative on the "state of war in the Balkans", because as it is being outlined: Serbia demands Russian armaments, European money, Chinese investments and American tolerance. In these conditions not of a slightly unbalanced Balkan balance, what can happen to the politically tense Balkans and not only ?.

5. Conclusion

For this it is necessary to understand Putin's move in Kosovo, which consists of a kind of geopolitical reaction, which in their essence are based on ideas and expansionist political theory. That is why the West's responsibility for the situation in the Balkans is a kind of combination of negligence, half-hearted efforts to establish peace, plus humanitarian efforts to deal with the symptoms, because when the state functions properly, it exercises the monopoly of force. , as well as the monopoly of law. Meanwhile, when the monopoly of force is lost and the law ceases to exist and is replaced by the exercise of private violence and private benefits, which turn into principles that govern the territory.

This does not need to be proven, because we Albanians have experienced the real possibility of breaking the monopoly of force and law, in 1997, for this we are referring to Della Rocca, who explains the time when Albanian politics came out of its bed, by not exercising wisdom and law, it became possible to exercise authoritarianism, which failed to function, consequently the Albanian society went from financial crisis to political crisis and, consequently, the dissolution of the state. In the context of the "Ukraine" crisis and the reflections of this crisis in the Balkans, it seems that political forces have turned their attention to the functioning of the state, which reflects on policy-making and the exercise of monopoly power, to control the impact of this crisis on Albania.

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