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THE STEPS OF THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY 1920

Abstract

The paper introduces these key ideas: First, Albania admitted to the League of Nations remained under international protection in terms of its rights to independence and territorial integrity. Second, Any intervention against Albania would be brought to the League of Nations, which would have to check that no one of the Balkan potentials acted to break Albania. Thirdly, Albania's accession to the League of Nations was a consequence of itself, while in international affiliation the acceptance of a country into the League of Nations brought with it its recognition as a state. Fourth, this act marked a recognition of the state and of the Albanian government and paved the way for the fair resolution of the Albanian issue at the Ambassador's Paris Conference in 1921. It was precisely on 9 November 1921 that this Conference made its final decision for Albania: recognition the independence of Albania and the borders of 1913, with some changes in the northeast in favor of Serbia

Key words: political agreement, harmony, good neighborliness, independence, political territory, decision, political, government, state.

The steps of the Albanian Government in foreign policy 1920

Taking a retrospective look at these developments, we can say that the attitude of American politics was decisive, even more so in the absence of the London Treaty decisions, and the formulas within it. Wilson's interventions, through memoranda, had brought a new philosophy to the harmonization of issues that had been put forth by the Peace Conference in Paris. There was

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a new force of relations between the Great Powers and at the same time the secret diplomacy had been damaged. This had made it possible to find a new expression in dealing with the Albanian issue, creating new opportunities for re-establishing Albania's independence decisions and its borders.

The organization of Albanian² state institutions had been a decisive factor in dealing with the Albanian issue in international relations. The US intervention against the compromise of the European powers of 13-14 January 1920, foreseeing a new fragmentation of Albania, namely its northern part (Shkodra), was in Albania's good, because it avoided the break-up, giving it a greater incentive for the Albanian National Movement to make improvements in the Albanian internal terrain. While announcements from the Lushnja Congress delegation still in Paris were even less promising. His diplomatic efforts had not brought any concrete result. Given the unfavorable international political situation, in March 1920 the government of Tirana had asked the government of Rome, through the military command in Vlora, to review its position by respecting Albanian national rights.

While in March the National Council left the Congress of Lushnja had defined the government's duties in the field of foreign policy, to take the appropriate measures at this stage to ensure the independence of Albania and to join those regions that were not yet under the control of the Government of Tirana. While the High Council, on March 26, 1920, pointed out that with the Yugoslav and Greek neighbors "we all have the will to live in a friendly harmony. We have great hope that even our neighbors have the same ethnic and vital rights. We hope that Italy will take into account the common will of the Albanian nation, change the policy that has hitherto been on the Albanian issue and will become the member of Albania's independence and integrity³. "

In the same differing view of Italy, on April 1, 1920, the National Council also expressed. But the Italians refused to enter into talks with the Albanian side, especially regarding the issue of sovereignty over the city of Vlora. It maintained the view that the Albanian side had to wait for the conclusions of the Peace Conference talks, as envisioned in the August 20, 1919⁴ agreement.

² -The program announced at the Lushnja Congress was followed by a rapidly expanding movement across the country. The government of Durrës had left the new government, which was located in Tirana on February 11, 1920. At the end of March, the first meeting of the Assembly came out of the Lushnja Congress, the Albanian provinces were laid under the new power; the invading forces that were there since the war; agreed with this reality, and the southern areas were subordinated administrative bodies of the Tirana Government, even though they were under the Italian invasion. Even in Shkodra, in mid-March 1920, the French garrison wardens were removed (Arben Puto, "Diplomatic History of the Albanian Issue 1878-1929", p. 326, Tirana 2003).

³ -History of the Albanian People III, 28 November 1912-7 April 1913, Tirana 2007, p. 150.

⁴ -AMPJ. I spend a temporary accommodation in Albania, August 20, 1919. File no. 3, 1919, f. 78.

But, realizing a reasonable compromise, she had decided to make these tolerances to the Italian side. First, the use of military bases in the Bay of Vlora; secondly, the organizational assistance of Italy; Third, the recognition of special economic interests in Albania. The Tirana Government had found it reasonable to associate these issues with certain conditions. First, the Italian side had to recognize the administrative union of the prefecture of Vlora with other parts of the country. Second, Italy had to engage in respecting the independence of the Albanian state. Even though politically the Albanian government had been released, this was not accompanied by the same language by the Italian side. That had created the possibility for the Government of Tirana to be prepared with other means.

Then, under the conditions that the Albanian delegation was not listening to the Peace Conference, once Italian politics did not provide any sign of compromise, the Albanian political circles were reflecting the views that were dealt with at the Lushnja Congress that war should be used as a last resort that could bring the sovereignty of the Albanian nation⁵. Under these conditions, the government of Tirana had tried to pursue solving politically in the Vlora case. Thus, on April 3, 1920, the Albanian government had asked Roma representatives in Albania to allow the involvement of the prefecture of Vlora under the administration of the Albanian state, bearing in mind that, by contrast, the government of Tirana was given the right to act.

While on April 10, 1920, F. Kastold⁶i was received in Vlora by Piacentin and said he was leaving for a poll near Tirana, but he was stopped in Durrës and met with the prefect of Esad Toptani and his people⁷. He was tasked with knowing that he would find the possibility for the Albanian government to accept the Roma view. The maintenance of Vlora from Italy was in the interest of both

⁵ -The newspaper "Drita", Gjirokastër, April 1920, no. 89, f.4

⁶ -He left the colonial military career and entered into diplomacy as a full-fledged minister with an official mission to handle and guide all Albanian political issues. It was the worst choice that Italian politics could do. In fact, he came upon a commission to impose an inadequate policy, to exaggerate the exodus movement to undermine the Lushnja Congressional platform and to turn the situation in favor of Italy.

⁷ He immediately reported to Rome good news "weak government, no force, no means". On the contrary, the Esadist movement is spreading "is gaining weight and will soon overcome its opponents". In Rome, hopeful of Kastold's report. Esad was a "vicious paper", so much so that the Esadist forces on those days were endangering Tirana. But the Italians did not agree between them. Piacentin ordered the Italian garrison to oppose the Esadistas. Two faces, optimism and arrogance of the "down from the sky" commander and the realization of the general confronted each other, seeing instead that the politics of violence had no chance. While the high spheres of the Foreign Ministry were still locked up in the previous formulas. Arben Puto "Political Albania 1912-1939," p. 262, Tirana 2009.

countries, thus constituting an “insurance for Albania itself”⁸.

On April 28, 1920, Sforca gave Kastoldi's instructions to reaffirm the plan for the Italian Vlorë. The latter had conveyed to the Albanian government and at a preliminary meeting with Sulejman Delvin, he spoke with arrogance that Italy would have full sovereignty over Vlorë, and had claimed to leave some territories to Greece and Yugoslavia. From that moment Sulejman Delvin had refused to wait for me, not only so, but was informed that “the government did not know any high commissioner for control over the government with the agreement of 20 August 1919. These agreements the government called it unlawful unviable, it undermined the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Albanian state”⁹.

Kastoldi was under the pressure of the repeated request of the Tirana government for the release of Vlora and its suburbs. The Roma government had opposed it with the same reasoning, “you know the view of the ruling government over the Vlora issue surrounded by an adequate hinterland, remain in our hands steadily and without obstacles¹⁰,” the Italian Ministry of Education Foreign Affairs on April 28, 1920, the High Commissioner in Albania. After this, Rome sought new opportunities to overcome the situation in Albania. She had tried to support some politicians who were dissatisfied with the positions that had taken hold of political power behind the Lushnja Congress. This seems to be reflected in the letter sent by Pandeli Evangjeli on May 2, 1920 to his friends, which among other things showed that “their principal is Mustafa Kruja, who works day and night with Italy's money, mentioning Pasha (Esad Pasha) as the only man who can save Albania. Kruja has sent an ultimatum to the government to give up”¹¹.

Under conditions created in the spring of 1920, Albania's position became more critical, the Tirana government had valued the main enemy of Italy and tried to avoid war on both fronts. Starting from the point of view, “today, we have to be careful not to raise issues with Yugoslavia, why the Yugoslavs can understand Italians on our backs, and we are not able to make war across the world¹²,” on the basis of this logic and interests, MP Sejfi Vllamasi, accredited with a letter from Aqif Pasha as a member of the regiment, held talks at the Yugoslav foreign minister. Yugoslav parties were asked: First, the return of some Albanian cities around the Albanian-Yugoslav border, which would strengthen the Albanian state both from the economic and the political point of view, against

⁸ -*History of Albania III, Tirana 2007.*

⁹ -*Eqerem Vlora “Memories”, vt. II, Tiranë, House of Book and Communication 2001, p. 133*

¹⁰ - *There again.*

¹¹ - *AMPJ, File no. 28, 1920, f. 12 “Epandle Letter to the Evangelical Beloved Agalar”*

¹² - *“The Albanian People's War ...”, then. III, Tirana 1984, f. 218.*

the common Italian rivalry¹³. Secondly, the departure of Yugoslav forces from Albanian occupied territories. The Belgrade side did not even want to discuss it, while the latter was justified by pointing out that the presence of Yugoslav troops in Albania¹⁴ was linked to the existence of the forces in Albania. In principle, the Yugoslav party was in the position of the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference¹⁵. Belgrade's policy had no confidence in the K-Albanians' struggle against the Italian invaders and did not want to declare openly in anti-Italian politics for another reason: the Yugoslav delegation was continuing talks with the Italian state delegation on the "Adriatic issue" and disputes of them had not found the way of solution. While in the internal plan, the Yugoslav politics was interested in supporting the movement of Esad Toptani, who was the main internal opponent of the Tirana government, for the most part in Albania, the Esadist movement was active.

While at the end of April 1920 the Albanian government had sent to Korça Eshref Frashëri with a message from Sulejman Devine for the French command, reminding him that for the future he expressed the conviction that as in the past he would continue to consider with generous benevolence to the requirement that the city council of the city will have the permission to submit it to the supreme interest of his homeland¹⁶ “.

¹³ - Sejfi Vllamasi, "Historical Memories and Memories", notebook no. 4. f. 174.

¹⁴ - History of Albania, ul. III, Tirana 1984, f. 219.

¹⁵ - If Albania is deprived of its independence and will have an autonomous government, Italy will receive Vlorë and a mandate over the rest of Albania, while Greece, southern Albania with Gjirokastra and Korca, in the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian state will to win, in addition to Northern Albania, the ratification of the Serbian-Albanian borders in the eastern part of the border. Mandates should be set for a deadline and Albania neutralized and demilitarized. The answer of Mr. While in the afternoon the Serbian-Slovenian delegation, in the afternoon meeting held at Ke d'Orse at point four said: As far as Albania is concerned, the Delegation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of the Kingdom of Slovenia also withdraws one in the beginning, that the best choice would be that the administration of Albania, that Albania, which was created at the Ambassador's Conference in 1913, was entrusted to an autonomous local government without the intervention of any Power foreigners. If this solution is not accepted, and if the parts of the Albanian territory are finally adapted to other states, then the northern border becomes subject to regulation as shown in the attached map. The Albanian districts will enjoy the autonomous province as a special regime, analogous to that which is stimulated by the Peace Treaty with the Czechoslovak Republic for the autonomous Ruthenian province of Czechoslovakia. (The Question Adriatique - Records of documents officiels - Paris, Imprimerie Typographique, 3, Rue de Pondichery, 3 (xve), ADRIATICUS-1924, pp. 106-112.

¹⁶ - Whereas the representatives of Korça and Pogradec had presented to the French military the requirement to allow the administrative union of the two provinces that were represented with the rest of the country under the national government; did not answer because he could not act without obtaining permission from the superior command that followed the Paris guidelines, which continued to support Greek claims on South Albania. This attitude was repeated in May 1920, when Paris decided to withdraw its contingent from Korça. In this case, French diplomacy favored the replacement of French troops in Koçë and the Greek ones. The request for substitution

Under these conditions, Trikupis ordered the march and to interconnect the Albanian authorities with interim agreements. But such a move to Venizelos had been recommended by the government of London. So it seemed that the Albanian government's relations with the Greek government had begun to move on a safer ground. Greece was committed to military and diplomatic actions for the realization of its goals in the Balkans and Minor Asia¹⁷. This favorable situation between the two states enabled Korça to hold the first talks between Jakov and the representatives of the movement in Korça. Their essence was finding the means to avoid an armed struggle and consultations with the Greek government. Consequently, in the afternoon of May 27, 1920 a representative of James, Papapreto priest, and three representatives of the national movement in Korça, Pandeli Cale, Qani Dishnica and Nikolla Zoi had managed to create the potential bed for the Albanian government to have easier agreement with the Greek government.

Thus, it was possible to establish an agreement between the two governments. The Greek side consisted of Iliakis and Trikupis, while the Albanian side consisted of Eshref Frashëri, General Director of the Tirana Government's Works, Jorgo Recj, President of the Council of Europe, Pandeli Cale, former Albanian Minister Qani Dishnica, Member of the Council of Paris, Nikola Zoi, finance director, and Captain Selahedin Blloshmi, who took with them a French officer, and set off toward the Albanian-Greek border; there they met with representatives of the Greek government, which consisted of General Trikupis, General Iliakis of Thrace. They, with the approval of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, agreed to enter talks to sign the agreement¹⁸. The protocol was signed the next day, May 28, 1920¹⁹ and can be divided into two parts, relating to the

was approved by Parisi in the second ten-day of May, despite the fact that the Paris Conference had not yet finally been expressed about the political future of Korça, regardless of the US view, according to which Korça should remain at the border of the state Albanian. While in Korça on 26 May the national flag was lifted in March 1919, while the Municipality of Korça and the Council of Paris declared joining the government of Tirana and decided to protect the city from a possible Greek aggression. Because the Hellenic army of N. Trikupis had begun to flee to the French state in Korça in the direction of the Albanian state border. This is how the Athens government faced an unexpected state of affairs. "History of the Albanian People, III", 28 November 1912 - April 7, 1939, Tirana 2007. p. 154.

¹⁷ - Athens's diplomacy was noted for the realization of the interests in the Sevres treaty in August 1920 (Arben Puto, "Diplomatic History of the Albanian Case 1878-1926", Tirana, Albin 2003, f. 328

¹⁸ - Where they met with the general governor of the West Thrace, Iliakis, and the mayor of the city. With the approval of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, they agreed to enter into negotiations to sign the treaty ("Historical Studies" No. 4, Tirana, 1987, p. 82. Muin Chami, "Kapshtica Protocol").

¹⁹ - In the afternoon, after Albanian representatives had gone to Florin, they returned to Korça where they had been given the necessary authorization and went back to the border in Kapshtica,

obligations of the signatory parties. The Greek side had the obligation to stop the advancement of the Greek army to invade Korça. While the Albanian side took three engagements of a temporary character, until matters were settled at the Peace Conference or in the talks between the two sides.

First, the feelings of the “Greeks” should not be felt, meaning Greek Greeks.

Secondly, to allow the functioning of churches and schools in Greek.

Third, accept the invasion of a land bush occupied by the Greek armies during their last march to conquer Korça²⁰.

We believe that the achievement of the signature of the Kapshtica Protocol is explained by the evaluation of two factors, giving its internal factor weight, which was related to the expansion of the authority of the Albanian government and the gradual stabilization of the order, at a time when Greece wanted to avoid it a possible conflict with the Albanian government because of the important commitments it had in the east. While the intervention of the English government must be seen as a very important external factor, which made it possible to exclude Greece from the conflict with Albania²¹. The subject of this act from a legal point of view was limited. He managed to maintain the existing situation in the border area and the Greek army had no right to enter the Albanian territory at the time the French army departed. This situation would continue until the border issue was resolved through the Peace Conference in Paris, or even with direct agreement between the two governments.

This historic event was an international agreement that had been linked by the Government of Tirana and was once the first act recognized by a foreign government as a party. But this act, from a diplomatic point of view, clearly improved its position in relation to the Italian government. This made it possible to temporarily close an overly problematic frontier and make it possible for the Government of Tirana to be diplomatically and militarily reminded of the plans of Italy in Vlora²².

even doubled as a number and this time accompanied by Jakov, who had signed the agreement, without any quality, just as present (ibid, 83).

²⁰ - USA, F. MPJ, dosje nr. 233, f. 56.

²¹ - *Conflict that would lead to the weakening of the struggle against the Turkish movement. Such a weakening of London's policy would not be wished for well-known reasons because it wanted to dictate Turkey's conditions of peace through the Hellenic army, which he wanted to have as strong and focused as possible. This had made it possible that at the last moment England opposed the invasion of Korca by Greek troops. He had asserted Venizelos, a French military attaché in Grecia's capital, General Grama, on May 29, 1920, adding that he was satisfied with this solution. (A.F. Frangulis "The Greater World Crisis", Paris, Libraire Felix Alcan, 108, Boulevard Saint-Germain, 108, 1926).*

²² - *Since March 1920, some parallel power had begun to form and operate, represented by the local "National Defense" committees, an unofficial secret organization with the objective of liberating Vlora; by the end of May they had managed to organize enough forces to oppose*

Following the Italian Prime Minister's speech on 27 June 1920 on the situation in Albania and the fight against the Italian army in Vlora, in early July 1920 the Italian-Albanian talks took place; Baron Alioti had held a meeting with representatives of the Tirana Government in the Porto Romano of Durrës: Interior Minister Ahmet Zogu, Minister without Portfolio Spiro J. Kola, a vlonja (A. Mehmeti), Nuri bej Villa, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The "Assembly" newspaper dated July 23, 1920 under the title "Why the agreement protocol was not signed" made it clear that the Tirana government had opposed the Italian party's request for it to hold some strategic positions in the Gulf of Vlora. Baron Alioti, refusing to sign the protocol, completed a tour in Vlora. On July 16, he was in the port of Vlora, where he met General Piacentin, General Puliezen and other militaries. Gen. Piacentin, with Baroness Aliot's counsel on July 17, sent to Drashovicë Ulusie Bosion to talk with representatives of the National Defense Committee, which had come to an end without results.

Alioti spent nearly all of July from Vlore to Durrës and then to Tirana. There were several meetings with Sulejman Delvina and repeatedly sent reports on the talks, pointing to the unwavering stance of the Albanian side for the full withdrawal of Italian troops from Vlora. In one of the few reports, he noted that "The interim government recognizes our internal difficulties very well and speculates on the harsh conditions of Vlora defense, which the Italian press has made known in the case of the controversy that sparked the behavior of the Socialist Party, and it was impossible to convince Albanians about the presence of Italy in Vlora"²³.

Whereas the attacks of 22 and 23 July against the Italian army in Vlora had forced the Italian government to review its position; she had agreed to enter into new talks with the Albanian government. Instead of Baroness Aliot, the Roma government sent for Manzoni's²⁴ resumption of talks in Tirana. Italy had requested that the talks be held in Durrës, but the Albanian government had persisted in Tirana, where the meeting was also held. Manzoni was put in front of the fact done. At the meeting with Sulejman Delvin, he was informed that the text was ready. "So just 24 hours after the deal in Tirana, Manzoni, confident of

the Italian army. On May 29, 1920, a meeting was held at the Baçallës hill in the south of the city, which had produced a letter sent to S. Piacentini on June 3rd. The letter was an ultimatum request. Italy should hand over the administration over Vlora and all the south and hand it over to the Government of Tirana. (Arben Puto "Diplomatic History of the Albanian Issue", Tirana 2003, 331 pp.

²³ - Arben Puto, "Political Albania", Tirana, Toena 2009, p. 272.

²⁴ - This is how Aliot's mission ended. Sforza is shocked by his failure, but he does not lose hope. He thought that some "mistakes of the past" had to be corrected to smooth the ground in negotiations with the Albanian side. For this reason, the Titonius-Venizelos Treaty of July 1919 was denounced as a first step (Korça Gazette, July 24, 1920, No. 8, p. 10).

the already hopeless situation, demanded authorization for the firm. The force was immediately authorized on 29 July and the Tirana Protocol was signed on 2 August 1920²⁵. “

The deal forced Italy to withdraw its armies from Albania before 2 September 1920 and its intentions to annex Vlorë, committing itself to respecting Albania's full independence and territorial integrity. Whereas, based on the second point, the Italian government should provide sufficient evidence of respect for Albanian sovereignty over Vlora and “repatriate Italian troops currently blocked in Vlora and its coastline and other parts of Albania²⁶”. While the Albanian side made a leap leaving the island of Sazani in Italy's use, but not finally annexed to it. At one time K-Albanians would be relocated to the shores of Shushica and Vlora would be considered a neutral zone during the period of repatriation of Italian military forces. But the Albanian government would take all its functions to administer the city and province of Vlora accompanied by a sufficient number of gendarmes.

However, after the conflict with Italy, the Albanian government was still struggling with the two neighboring states, north and south, and to cope with this situation²⁷. To achieve this, in the autumn of 1920, it had shifted its center of activity into international politics from the Paris Peace Conference in the League of Nations²⁸.

On October 12, 1920, the Albanian delegation at the Peace Conference presented to the Secretary General, Drumond, the request of the Government of Tirana for Albania's accession to the League of Nations²⁹. While referring to Professors Valentina Duka, one of the most important tasks of politics outside of Iliaz Vrioni's government was the recognition of Albania in the League of Nations. Thus, on October 12, 1920, through a request addressed to the League of Nations, the Albanian government had demanded its recognition, “but this demand had faced the open opposition of Yugoslavia, Greece and France standing behind them³⁰.” Below adds that the English Government announced to Tirana

²⁵ - USA, F. 271, viti 1920, dosja nr. 35, f. 165.

²⁶ - National Library. “Traduction of the Preliminary Process of Tirana”, Tirana, 2 Aoug 1920, p. 1-2 (Sulejman N. Delvina), G. Manzoni. AL. 10/51 C.

²⁷ - The government had focused attention on the international re-affirmation of the 1913 decisions on recognition of Albania and its borders.

²⁸ - Which represented some advantages compared to the Peace Conference. The conference was an organ in the narrow circle of winning powers and outside any public opinion control. Whereas the League of Nations brought a new element in international life; she addressed problems in the debate on the basis of publicity, hence public participation.

²⁹ - USA, f. 251, viti 1920, dosja nr. 54, f. 138.

³⁰ - Vlentina Duka, *History of Albania 1912-2000*, Tirana, Toena 2007, p.129.

that it was ready to support its accession to the League of Nations, provided that the Albanian government provided English-Persian Anglo-Persian society with the exclusive right to request and use kerosene in Albania. The government of Iliaz Vroni unconditionally accepted the English proposal³¹. A comprehensive summary of the decisions of the Ambassadors Conference of July 29, 1913, as well as the Organic Statute of Albania, were presented. While on November 22, 1920, the Albanian delegation also presented a special memorandum containing the Albania's application platform for admission to the League of Nations³². These problems had also been brought before the Special Committee of the League Assembly, which had been formed for the examination of admission requirements. The Albanian delegation faced the question: Did the government *de jure*, *de facto*, and by whom? On the basis of which, the Legal Section of the Secretariat had interpreted that³³ ..., and "the Albanian government was not *de facto* or *de jure* recognized by any other power³⁴".

This was one of the negative conclusions for which the Italian delegation had the main part, arguing that the delegation of the Italian delegation to Tirana with the senior official Manzoni, talks that led to the agreement of 2 August 1920 and the removal of Italian troops from Vlora, could not be considered as recognition. "The Italian government did not recognize the Albanian government neither *de jure* nor *de facto*". But the worst was that with this view were the representatives of Greece, France, Yugoslavia, which, according to the French delegation, the decision to accept Albania was a challenge to the Powers that had not yet defined its status.

The Assembly had considered Albania's request at the 17 December 1920

³¹ - *There again*, f.129.

³² - *Based on the judgment that Albania was not a new state, it had its charter before the World War I and the existence of the independent state had the approval of the Conference in London. The main acts that had been recognized by the Albanian state were from 1913 to 1914 and none of the Signatory Powers of these decisions had denounced it. The memorandum raised the problems of Albania and during World War I, its terrain had become a war site, a fact that made possible the flagrant violation of the 1913-1914 decisions. The decisions taken could not be violated either by the London Secrecy Treaty of 1915. This situation had made it possible to cause a total chaos in the Albanian territory, which consequently destroyed those state structures that could have been built before the World War. With the end of the war, the Albanian state had regained and overcome some difficulties and managed to maintain the territory of 1913. After the war, the Albanian government had managed to control the situation within the country. The Memorandum was a legal remedy, defending the view that the Albanian government had all the attributes to be *de facto* and *de jure* governments and had come out of a national assembly (Lushnja Congress) and had managed to emerge as a party to the 1920 agreement with Greece The compromise of Kapshtica), and the agreement with Italy on 2 August 1920. (Preliminary Protocol of Tirana, National Library AL 10/51 C).*

³³ - *That *de jure* recognition of Albania by Powers in 1914 could not be called more effective.*

³⁴ - Arben Puto, "Shqipëria politike" Tiranë, Toena 2009, f. 192.

hearing, which completely closed the situation and Albania's candidacy had passed unanimously, being protected by Robert Cecil and N.W. Rouell³⁵. They rejected the opposing theses that were heard at the Fifth Commission and called Albania's status compatible with its admission to the League of Nations³⁶. This helped to improve the situation by creating the premise of joining all other representatives and on December 17, 1920, Albania was unanimously accepted as a member of the League of Nations. This historic moment is reflected in the newspaper "Sun" on 12 November 1921, "The first is Lord Robert Cecil. The second is bishop Theofan S. Nolin, the prime minister of Albania in the League of Nations. All delegates, without any exception, to the most important Conference are mindful that the Conference will bring good trees³⁷. "

While other papers, such as the "Korca newspaper", on December 22, 1920, under the title: "Albania admitted to the League of Nations", made known the enthusiasm with which this important political event was expected by the prime minister of that time Iliaz Vrioni, and praised the Albanians "with a special pleasure that Albania with common votes was admitted to the League of Nations. This acceptance is the strongest sign of securing our independence. Therefore I would like to express my wishes and affections to the entire Albanian people³⁸. " Earlier on this spectrum, Albania would be present in the international situation and at the same time invited by those countries that might have opposed its admission.

Thus, at the beginning of January 1921, the "Korca newspaper" reflected the reception of the Albanian delegation headed by Midhat Frashëri, at the French Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Selvić, who had heard about half an hour of Albania's state of affairs and welcomed "Albania's admission to the League of Nations. France decided to send as a representative in Albania a ministry as a charge d'affair, d.mth in charge of work³⁹ ", and for the most important areas in" four consular Albania⁴⁰ ". On November 12, 1921, the Albanian Prime Minister sent the telegram to the Federation "Vatra" and reported that "The Royal Guvernas of his Great Britain recognized the Albanian de facto and de

³⁵ - *They had made the facts presented in the memo of the Albanian delegation.*

³⁶ - *Thus, the covert war treaties and the projects that were made at the Peace Conference remained only in the paper and did not affect the position of Albania as an internationally recognized state.*

³⁷ -- *Journal "Dielli", Boston, November 12, 1921, p. 1, nr. 2285, "What do you mean Lord Cecil: The Thought of Bishop Noli?"*

³⁸ - *Korçë newspaper, December 22, 1920, no. 34, f. 1 art "Albania admitted to the League of Nations"*

³⁹ - *"Journal of Korça", January 5, 1921, no. 58, f. 1 art "Foreign Affairs Commission heard Albanian delegation on the situation in Albania"*

⁴⁰ - *there again, f.1*

jure⁴¹ government”.

While Faik Konica, on November 12, 1921, informed the Albanian Prime Minister about the “Vatras” contribution to this difficult political process. The fire, Konica wrote, “in the hours when the homeland was violated, was the only remaining Albanian foundation, and to one point was the governor’s seat officially recognized by the British governor⁴².” But, analyzing this political event, the natural question arises: how could a hopelessly request go so far in an admission? This issue should have two arguments:

First of all, the Albanian factor had a significant increase as a result of the demonstration of the Albanian will through the Congress of Lushnja and the Vlora War, accompanied by a significant improvement of the political situation within Albania.

Secondly, politically, England had followed with particular attention to the situation in Albania, which could become the domain of English interests in exploiting the Albanian altitude⁴³.

So Albania admitted to the League of Nations remained under international protection in terms of its rights to independence and territorial integrity. Any intervention against Albania would be brought to the side of the League of Nations, which would have to check that none of the Balkan powers acted to break Albania. As a conclusion we can say that for the Albanian side, the agreement made in advance with the English government had achieved a great political victory. Albania’s accession to the League of Nations was a consequence of itself, while in international affiliation, the admission of a country to the League of Nations brought with it its recognition as a state. This act marked a recognition of the Albanian state and government and paved the way for the fair resolution of the Albanian issue at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris. On November 9, 1921, this Conference made its final decision on Albania: the recognition of Albania’s independence and the borders of 1913, with some changes in the northeast in favor of Serbia.

⁴¹ - The newspaper “Dielli” Boston, November 11, 1921, nr. 2285, f. 1 art “The British Government makes the first step 11 November 1921”.

⁴² - The newspaper “The Sun”, Boston, November 12, 1921, no. 2286, f. 1. art “Faik Konica sends telegram to the Prime Minister”.

⁴³ - England’s interest in Albania’s kerosene sources was becoming more and more. Taking advantage of the difficult international position of the Albanian state, the English government announced to Tirana that it would make Albania’s accession to the League of Nations possible if the Albanian government would give Anglo-Persian angling Persian society an exclusive right to seek and used kerosene in Albania. The government of Iliaz Vrioni, who in November 1920 replaced that of Sulejman Delvina, unconditionally accepted the above mentioned English requirement. *History of Albania*, ul. third (1912-1944), Tirana 1984, p. 239.